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INTRODUCTION
"No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quarteredin any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.-"
In 2005, the United States experienced one of the most devastating
disasters in its history, and in reaction, both federal and state governments deployed large numbers of troops and military personnel within
the United States. 2 Approximately fifty thousand National Guard per* B.A., Connecticut College, 2004; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2008. This Note is dedicated to the indefatigable Morgan Williams and all the members of the Student Hurricane
Network past and present who have helped the Crescent City and Gulf Coast. Thanks goes to
Dustin Smith, Holly McHugh, and the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy associates for
their meticulous editing, and also to Melody Wells for uncovering the Third Amendment violation that sparked this Note. Lastly, and most importantly, I would like to thank my mother
and father, my sisters, Katie, Margaret, and Izzy, and Augusta Wilson for their love, succor,
and advice.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
2 U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUBL'N No. 06-618, CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS:
ENHANCED LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE

748

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17:747

sonnel and countless relief workers occupied southeastern Louisiana and
the Mississippi Gulf Coast in response to the humanitarian crisis caused
by Hurricane Katrina. 3 This was "the largest domestic military deployment within the United States since the Civil War."'4 Troops, personnel,
and equipment came from all fifty states, two U.S. territories, and the
5
District of Columbia.
The situation in southeastern Louisiana and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina was chaotic, dangerous, and anarchic, and the National
Guard had to overcome logistical obstacles and implement heavy-handed
measures to maintain order in some areas. Because of the diverse military presence and extensive damage to communication infrastructure,
command structures occasionally broke down among the military. 6 Due
to the lack of structurally sound military housing,7 the National Guard
sought shelter wherever possible, sleeping in schools, 8 convention centers, 9 hospitals, 10 hotels,11 churches, 12 and tents along the side of the
road. 13 Occasionally, Guardspersons seeking quarter were met with re1 (2006)
("Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster in our nation's history in geographic scope,
the extent and severity of its destruction and damage, and the number of persons displaced
from their homes . . . whose effects almost immediately overwhelm the response capacities of
affected state and local first responders and require[d] outside action and support from the
federal government and other entities.").
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY SYSTEM

3 TOM DAVIS ET AL., A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITrEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KA-

TRINA, H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 202 (2006). In total, 61,450 civilian and National Guard
personnel were sent to Louisiana and Mississippi by March 24, 2006. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 2, at 13.

4 H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 201 (citing Hearing on HurricaneKatrina: Preparedness
and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005)).
5 H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 207.
6 See id. at 219-21 ("[Ljines of command, control, and communication lacked clear
definition and coordination between federal military forces and National Guard forces ....
").
7 See JED HORNE, BREACH OF FAITH: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE NEAR DEATH OF A
GREAT AMERICAN CITY 121 (2006) (noting that the Hurricane flooded the New Orleans, Louisiana, National Guard post); see also THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 7 (2006) (hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (estimating that 300,000
homes were destroyed or made uninhabitable).
8 Kim Cobb, Katrina'sAftermath: Schools: Mississippi'sNew Take on the 3R's: Repair
Buildings, Replace Textbooks, Reopen in October, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2005, at A18.
9 Hamilton Nolan, Corporate Profile-CVB Bringing People Back to the Bayou, PR
WEEK, Dec. 11, 2006, at 7.
10 Hurricane Katrina-The Aftermath: Meadowcrest Employees Protest Parish Order,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 14, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 19614104 [hereinafter The Aftermath].
11 Kathleen Pender, Investors Bet on Katrina, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 2005, at El.
12 Christmas Gala, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 30, 2006, at 8.

13 Dahleen Glanton, Tent Life Wears Thin on Evacuees: 3 Weeks After Storm, Mississippi Victims Waiting for Trailers, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 2005, at C1.
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sistance. 14 To counter resistance, the National Guard's approach to
maintaining order was sometimes harsh, as they commandeered private
property for military use 15 and limited civilians' speech rights. 1 6 Occasionally, the National Guard themselves even participated in the lawlessness that they were sent to stop. 17 The lack of housing, high military
presence, and gaps in communications among personnel in the area were
ingredients for a potential Third Amendment violation: the quartering of
troops in a home during peacetime without the owner's permission.
For over 200 years, the Third Amendment has "rest[ed] in obscurity." ' 8 It has been called the "forgotten amendment,"' 9 "undoubtedly
obsolete,' 20 at best an "innocent bystander," '2 1 and at worst "an insignificant legal fossil." '2 2 According to the late Justice William Douglas, it has
"no immediate relation to any modem problem. ' 23 While this may have
been historically true, marginalizing the importance of the Third Amendment today exposes individuals to a potentially real loss of civil liberty.
When the government deploys the military domestically to restore order,
the only protection individuals have against military abuse of power,
other than vigilantism, is the self-discipline of military personnel to
14 See The Aftermath, supra note 10 (describing hospital workers protesting the National
Guard's continued use of the hospital).
15 Marty Whitford, Steps to Recovery: New Orleans PMPs Stand Tall in Their Commitment to Come Back Stronger than Everfrom Katrina, Rita, PEST CONTROL, Nov. 1, 2006, at 20
(noting that the National Guard commandeered all seven of a company's pest control trucks,
which the owner had to track down to restart his business).
16 See Doug MacCash, Devoted to Art: '80s Music Man Mark Mothersbaugh of Devo
Fame Brings His Oddly Appealing Photos to the 9th Ward, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Nov. 10, 2006, at 13 (reporting that the National Guard arrested an artist for displaying his art
on the street near his gallery).
17 See Jarvis DeBerry, Police Supporters Fire Back at Columnist, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Sept. 22, 2006, at 7; Gerard Shields, Military Justice at Issue: 19 Court-Martialed; Some Say Officers Escaped, Issue, AoVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Aug. 24, 2006, at Al;
see also George E. Edwards, InternationalHuman Rights Law Violations Before, During, and
After HurricaneKatrina: An InternationalLaw Frameworkfor Analysis, 31 T. MARSHALL. L.
REV. 353 (2006) (speculating that the federal, state, and local government violated internationally recognized individual rights, including the right to private property and privacy).
18 Editorial, A Protection Prompted by Colonists' Hardship, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July 2,
2006, at HI; see also William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the
Issue of the Maintenance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 393,
394 (1991) ("For almost two hundred years, now, [the Third Amendment] has gone virtually
unnoticed.").
19 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN

ACTrON 107 (1991).
20 John S. Baker, Jr., The Effectiveness of Bills of Rights, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
55, 59 (1992).
21 Seymour W. Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated Third Amendment, 21
TENN. L. REV. 723, 733 (1951).
22 B. Carmon Hardy, A Free People's IntolerableGrievance: The Quartering of Troops
and the Third Amendment, 33 VA. CAVALCADE 126, 126 (1984).
23 William 0. Douglas, The Bill of Rights Is Not Enough, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 115, 121
(Edmond Cahn ed., 1963).
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honor the rights bestowed by the Constitution. If Americans generally
are unaware of these rights, or consider them obsolete or unimportant,
the government will not require the military to protect these rights and
individual civilians will not demand them. If Americans ignore the Third
Amendment, or dismiss it as trivial, they implicitly condone military incursion into their homes during domestic disasters when the rule of law
has failed. This not only opens the door for potential abuse, theft, and
destruction of individuals' personal property, but it allows the military to
have unbridled access to individuals' most private space. In an era
where natural and human-generated disasters are more likely, Americans
need to be more cognizant of their Third Amendment rights and prepared
to defend them.
This Note explores the possibility that Third Amendment violations
occurred in Louisiana or Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 24 the remedies available to Third Amendment litigants, and why
Americans need to be more aware of their Third Amendment rights in
the wake of disasters. Part I contains a brief history of the Third Amendment, including its original purpose as evidenced by its historical roots
and statements by its framers. Part II explores when and why the Third
Amendment has been utilized, why it has largely been neglected, and
why it is an important safeguard of civil liberties during domestic disasters. Part III examines each clause of the Third Amendment and offers
potential constructions in light of domestic military activity in Louisiana
and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. In particular, Part III analyzes
the legal definitions of "soldier," "quarter," "house," "time of war," and
"time of peace" for the purposes of the Third Amendment. Part III also
examines possible remedies and defenses to Third Amendment challenges and whether sovereign or qualified immunity shield the state or its
officers from civil liability.
The United States has enjoyed a long history of relative domestic
tranquility. During that time, there has been little need for constitutional
or statutory protection from domestic military encroachment. Nonetheless, continued tension between the United States and religious fundamentalist groups, as well as increasingly violent weather patterns, 25 are
grim reminders that a disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina may
occur again. In the event that such a disaster occurs, federal, state, and
local governments will call upon military personnel to preserve order and
provide relief. In circumstances like these, it will be essential for citi24 This Note does not focus on the applicability of the Third Amendment in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
25 See JOHN MCQUAID & MARK SCHLEIFSTEIN, PATH OF DESTRUCTION: THE DEVASTATION OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE COMING AGE OF SUPERSTORMS 351 (2006); Donald G. Mc-

Neil, Jr., The Nation: Saturation Point: Imagine 20 Years of This, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 2005,
§ 4, at 1.
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zens, the military, and the judiciary to better understand and appreciate
how the Third Amendment can protect civilians in domestic disasters.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
THIRD AMENDMENT
Anglo-American anti-quartering provisions date back to Norman
England. In 1131, the London city charter prohibited quartering soldiers
within the city walls.2 6 Other cities followed suit, and the prohibition of
troop quartering in homes spread slowly to other English urban centers
and eventually to the countryside. 27 Anti-quartering provisions in English city charters were a response to the advent of the permanent national army used to fight a series of continental wars during the middle
ages. 28 When feudal knight service failed to adequately fill the ranks for
battle, British Monarchs relied more heavily on pardoning criminals in
exchange for military service.2 9 These soldiers were less disciplined and
frequently took advantage of the civilian population. 30 In 1627, Parliament issued the "Petition of Right," which decried receiving soldiers into
private homes as a "great grievance and vexatlion of the people. ' 31 In
response to the English Civil War of the mid-seventeenth century, Parliament passed two nationwide anti-quartering acts. 32 Likewise, the En'33
glish Bill of Right of 1689 forbid "quartering soldiers contrary to law."
Although these acts applied to the entirety of Britain, they did not extend
34
to its fledgling colonies.
The first evidence of British troop quartering in colonial homes
dates back to King Philip's War, which took place in New England in
26 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, at 945 (David C. Douglas & George
W. Greenway eds., 1953) ("Let no one be billeted within the walls of the city, either [a soldier
of the King's household] or by the force of anyone else.").
27 See Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 117, 119-22 (1993); Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 399.
28 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 398-99.
29 Id.

30 Id.; see also WILLIAM LANGLAND, WILL'S VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN 34-35 (Talbot

E. Donaldson trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1990) (n.d.) (fourteenth-century poem in which a
farmer tells of the loss of his livestock and rape of his daughter at the hands soldiers).
31 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 217
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].
32 Bell supra note 27, at 124 (The first law, called the Anti-Quartering Act of 1679
provided that "no[ J officer military or civill nor any other person whatever shall from henceforth presume to place quarter or billet any souldier or souldiers upon any subject or inhabitant
of this realme . . . without his consent." This applied to both public and private structures.
The second anti-quartering act, the Mutiny Act of 1689, forbade quartering soldiers in private
homes only.).
33 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 217.
34 See J. Alan Rogers, Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During the
French and Indian War, MIL. AFF., Feb. 1970, at 7.
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1675. 35 In 1765, Parliament passed a quartering act requiring colonists
to bear the costs of quartering and supplying British troops for the French
and Indian War. 36 If barracks were unavailable, the act required that
colonists quarter troops in alehouses, stables, and inns. 37 In 1774, in
response to unrest in Boston, Parliament passed another act that permitted the quartering of troops in private homes. 38 During the Revolution
itself, both the British and American armies demanded quarter from
citizens.

39

The Third Amendment was a direct response to this history of involuntary quartering. 40 Prior to the Revolution, colonists repeatedly expressed displeasure over forced quartering. 4' The Quartering Act of
1774 was known popularly among colonists as one of the "Intolerable

Acts. ' '42 Benjamin Franklin wrote, "Let [the British] first try the effects
of quartering soldiers on butchers, bakers, or other private houses [in
England], and then transport the measure to America.

'4 3

As one histo-

rian notes, "[W]riters throughout the colonies attacked the practice of
' '44
quartering as despotic, dangerous, and violative of American rights.
Sentiments against peacetime quartering were strong among early
state legislators. Five state conventions established anti-quartering
amendments in their constitutions. 45 In addition, three of these states and
two others proposed that the federal government adopt some form of
35 See Bell, supra note 27, at 125.
36 Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 415.
37 Id.

38 The act permitted "soldiers ...to be quartered and billeted in such manner as is now
directed by law, where no barracks are provided by the colonies." ENGLISH HISTORICAL DocUMENTS: AMERICAN COLONIAL DOCUMENTS TO 1776, at 785 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1969). The

act also provided that soldiers could commandeer uninhabited structures if they were refused
quarter for over twenty-four hours. Id.
39 Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 422.
40 See id. at 423 (noting that according to Patrick Henry, quartering was one of the principle reasons for breaking with Britain); see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at
107 (arguing that the Third Amendment was proof that the Constitution was "written to address real and immediate grievances suffered by its authors").
41 Colonial leaders voiced their aversion to the Quartering Act of 1774 during the First
Continental Congress, ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, supra note 26, at 808,
and in the Declaration of Independence, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at
218; see also Rogers, supra note 34, at 9 (arguing that the forced quartering of British troops
was "the thin edge of the wedge that was being driven between the colonies and the home
country").
42 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, supra note 26, at 785.
43 GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 65
(1995).
44 RICHARD

A. PRiMUS,

THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS

45 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note

106 (1999).

31, at 216-17 (Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York); cf Bell, supra note 27, at 144-45 (noting that
today most states have anti-quartering provisions in their constitutions).
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anti-quartering law. 4 6 For some state convention delegates, incorporating an anti-quartering provision into the constitution of the new federal
47
government was essential for its ratification.
Including an anti-quartering amendment in the Bill of Rights may
have been a foregone conclusion given the long history of analogous
protections in Britain and given the strong and vocal opposition to peacetime quartering. 48 James Madison proposed the first draft of what would
become the Third Amendment in a resolution to Congress on June 6,
1789. 49 It read, "No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any
house without the consent of the owner; nor at any time, but in a manner
warranted by law." 50 After little debate, this version would, with only
minor changes, become law. 51 The proposed amendment was consistent
with the proposed amendments sent by all but one of the five states that
sent proposals to Congress. 52 The House debated and passed the
Amendment in one day, as did the Senate. 53 During the congressional
debates, only three individuals offered suggestions to the Amendmentall were rejected in favor of the Amendment's original form. 54 Neither
body of Congress made any substantive changes to the Amendment over
55
the course of the Bill of Rights debates.
According to Elbridge Gerry, a member of the first Congress, the
Third Amendment was enacted "to prevent the arbitrary exercise of
power. '56 In order to preserve civilian rights, "[t]he military ought to be
subordinate to civil authority. '57 This was especially true within the
sanctity of the home. Two generations after the country ratified the
Amendment, jurist Joseph Story wrote: "[The Third Amendment's] plain
object is to secure the perfect enjoyment of that great right of the com46 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 215-16 (New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia).
47 See id. at 220.
48 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 430 ("The practice of involuntary quartering
was considered to be so onerous by so many people that the amendment's inclusion in the
pantheon of rights was virtually beyond question. Further, the specific and limited nature of
the grievance made it possible to easily obtain a consensus as to an appropriate and all inclusive wording for the right.").
49 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 207.
50 Id.
51 See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
52 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 215 (noting that New Hampshire's
proposed amendment did not provide for legal wartime quartering).
53

Id. at

209-10.

54 See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY

RECoRD FROM THE FIRST

FEDERAL CONGRESS 179-80 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS].

55 See id. at 39-48.
56 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 220.
57 Id. at 221 (quoting FED. FARMER, Dec. 25, 1787).
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mon law, that a man's house shall be his own castle, privileged against
58
all civil and military intrusion."
In addition to protecting private property and privacy rights in the
face of the necessary evil of a standing army, 59 the framers had more
abstract reasons for ratifying the Third Amendment-they wanted to
maintain a distinct divide between military and civilian life. 60 This divide served not only to protect their individual rights, but to protect their
61
civilian government from permanent military usurpation.
Given its centuries-old predecessors, its apparent practical necessity, and its strong philosophical foundations in Anglo-American law, the
Third Amendment was ratified with uniquely little debate or controversy
and a high margin of support. 62 Since then, however, the Amendment
slipped from being a universally recognized right worthy of inclusion in
the nation's most sacred document, to being virtually unknown and unutilized for over two hundred years.
II.

A.

A HISTORY OF THE THIRD AMENDMENT'S USE AND
NEGLECT, AND WHY IT SHOULD BE REVIVED

WHEN HAS THE THIRD AMENDMENT BEEN USED?

In light of the Third Amendment's strong foundation in AngloAmerican law, it has primarily served as a building block for litigants to
construct arguments for analogous rights, rather than a basis for asserting
a primary right to protection from quartering without permission. 63 "Its
existence underscored the need for, and helped legitimize, the movement
for a codification of fundamental liberties. '64 Courts and litigants have
used the Third Amendment to bolster claims for various property and
privacy rights. 65 Occasionally, litigants have used the Third Amendment
58 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1893
(Leonard W. Levy ed., De Capo Press 1970) (1833).
59 See Bell, supra note 27, at 121 n.28; Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 417-18.
60 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 16 (1972) (maintaining that the Third Amendment
"reflect[s] a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs"); ANASTAPLO, supra note 43, at 66 (equating Third Amendment rights to the rights
of conscientious objectors in wartime); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1175 (1991).
61 See Rogers, supra note 34, at 10.
62 William S. Fields, The Third Amendment: ConstitutionalProtection From the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 MIL. L. REV. 195, 195 (1989).
63 Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 430 ("The third amendment... served as a broadly
accepted basic right upon which a structure of newer, more enigmatic and controversial rights
could ultimately be built.").
64 Id.
65 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 607-08 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gosney v. Sonora
Indep. Sch. Dist., 430 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 522
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to highlight the constitutional checks placed on the military. 66 In some
instances, litigants have argued frivolous and illogical Third Amendment
67
claims, which courts quickly dismiss.
Only once has it been directly litigated. In Engblom v. Carey,68 the
Second Circuit confronted the issue of whether National Guard troops
could be quartered in on-site residences of striking corrections officers.

After corrections officers at a state penitentiary went on strike, the governor of New York called the National Guard to maintain order at the

prison. 69 The Guardsmen stayed in state-owned dormitories for eleven
days. 70 The Corrections Officers sued the governor claiming a Third
Amendment right violation. 7 1 The court held that the Guardsmen were
soldiers for the purposes of the Third Amendment, and because the corrections officers had a property-based privacy interest in their residences,
the officers had a legal right to exclude the soldiers. 72 On remand, however, the district court held that qualified immunity protected the governor from liability because the striking corrections officers' rights under
the Third Amendment were not "clearly established. '73 On the one occasion Americans relied on the Third Amendment for protection, it was
useless simply because it had never been used.

(5th Cir. 1979) (rejecting a claim that a teacher had a privacy right to seek outside employment
from the school); Amar, supra note 60, at 1175 ("To the extent modem lawyers think about the
Third Amendment at all, they are likely to see it as an affirmation of the general right of
individual privacy thought to pervade the penumbras and inhabit the interstices of the Bill of
Rights."); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 172 (1968) (mentioning the Third Amendment only
once-in the context of privacy rights).
66 See Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972)); United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974); Jones v.
U.S. Sec'y of Def., 346 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn. 1972); see also Luther v. Borden 48 U.S. 1, 67
(1848) (Woodbury, J., Dissenting) (finding that the forced entry by militiamen into Luther's
home to arrest him constituted a Third Amendment violation).
67 Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Executive Sec. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 470, 473 n.2 (S.D.N.Y
1977) (dismissing a claim that a subpoena violated the claimant's Third Amendment right);
United States v. Valenzuela, 95 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.Cal. 1951) (rejecting a claim that the 1947
House and Rent Act is "the incubator and hatchery of swarms of bureaucrats to be quartered as
storm troopers upon the people").
68 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
69 See Ann Marie C. Petrey, The Third Amendment's ProtectionAgainst Unwanted Military Intrusion: Engblom v. Carey, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 857 (1982).
70 Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 63 (1981), rev'd, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
71 Id.

72 Engblom, 677 F.2d at 962.
73 Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1983).
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WHY IS THE THIRD AMENDMENT UNKNOWN?

There are five reasons why the Third Amendment has been "relegated to . . .obscurity.

'74

First, situations that could lead to possible

Third Amendment violations are probably uncommon. The military has
rarely required private property, let alone private dwellings, for its operations. 75 Soldiers are customarily quartered in barracks or camps sepa-

rated from civilian residential areas. 76 In cases where soldiers have used
civilian property without the consent of the property owner, owners have
only brought claims against soldiers for destruction of property or trespass, and not against the soldiers or government for impermissible quarter. 77 Soldiers may have committed Third Amendment violations during

the United States' few domestic wars but no violations have been litigated or documented. After the War of 1812, Congress authorized payment to homeowners whose property had been damaged as a result of
military occupation. 78 Although not stated as such, Congress may have
intended these reparations to make up for its failure to comply with the
Third Amendment and prescribe a legal method for quartering during the
war. During the Civil War, Congress passed a series of laws permitting
military confiscation and use of Confederate citizens' property, but
passed no analogous law regulating the use of property owned by Union
citizens. 79 At the end of the war, the Committee on War-Claims estimated that the war cost private citizens $500,000 in the Union and
$2,500,000 in the Confederacy for rent and damages. 80 It is unclear
whether any of these rents or damages were recompense for military
quarter, and no one in the wake of either conflict brought a Third
Amendment claim. 8 1
74 Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 393.
75 See Id. at 429.
76 Id.
77 See Ashby v. New York, 103 Misc. 206 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1918) (finding National Guardspersons who used farmers' fences and trees for firewood and pastured horses on farmers'
property liable for trespass); White v. M'Neily, 1 S.C.L (1 Bay) 11 (1784) (holding British
loyalists liable for trespassing on a plantation, commandeering horses, stealing furniture, and
Ct. Cl. 149 (Ct. Cl. 1912)
burning the plantation house); see also Smith v. Illinois, 2 Ill.
(awarding damages to land owner for the National Guard's destruction of foliage and plumbing while the National Guard was conducting a "sham battle").
78 Bell, supra note 27, at 137 n.162.
79 See GARRARD GLENN & A. ARTHUR SCHILLER, THE ARMY AND THE LAW 137 (1943).
Whether these statutes fulfilled the "manner prescribed by law" requirement was never
determined.
80 Bell, supra note 27, at 138 (noting that this is a woeful underestimation of the cost of
damages to civilians).
81 The constitution of the Confederacy contained an anti-quartering provision identical to
the Third Amendment, CONFED. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.14 (1861), but there is no evidence that
any Confederate citizen brought a claim under this Article during the country's existence; cf.
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (In an effort to recover his father's estate, which
was used as a military camp and then a cemetery during and after the Civil War, the son of
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Second, Third Amendment claims may be unpopular. During crises

and war, civilians have concerns that eclipse their desire to protect their
homes from invasion.

"Modem experience has shown that civilians

readily consent to quartering when threatened by a common enemy."8 2
Acquiescence to military incursion into the home is a function of the
belief that the military acts as a protector not an oppressor. 83 Citizens
tend to accept that, during emergencies, "[c]onstitutional rights should be

84
relaxed, so that the executive can move forcefully against the threat."

Also, in times of crisis, popular support for government intervention

overrides concerns for individual civil liberties. 85 As a result, the government is able to take broader license with little opposition. Additionally, during crises and war, people's primary concern is to minimize loss
86
of life, not maximize property rights.
Third, the lack of Third Amendment jurisprudence and legal scholarship prevents Third Amendment claims from being viable. First, potential litigants may be unaware when colorable Third Amendment
claims arise because they are not present when soldiers occupy their

homes or because they are not aware they have a constitutional protection at all.8 7 Second, the lack of interpretive guidance or record of successful litigation suggests to litigants that no remedy may be available
under the Third Amendment. 88 This deters lawyers who limit their advocacy to claims they see as realistic. Here, the Third Amendment's miniscule jurisprudence is telling. In Engblom, the district court found that the
Confederate General Robert E. Lee sued the U.S. government for ejectment but did not bring a
Third Amendment claim.).
82 Bell, supra note 27, at 133; see also Wurfel, supra note 21, at 733 (discussing how
during World War II civilians quartered soldiers who were on leave in their homes through the
United Service Organization, or who were given independent assignments in remote locations
such as antiaircraft defense).
83 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 18, at 429; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty
and Federalism,96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1500 (1987) ("The sturdy contemporary ethos of civilian
supremacy that makes an attempted military takeover unlikely today draws much of its
strength from an unblemished history of due subordination of the national military.").
84 Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, in THE CONSTITUrION
IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 55, 56 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) [hereinafter THE CONSrruTION IN WARTIME]; see also Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights and the

Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 41, 53 ("[N]o one has ever
thought [the Third Amendment] could be violated on the basis of an overweighing public
interest.").
85 See ALAN BARTH, THE RIGHTS OF FREE MEN: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO CIVIL LIBERTIES 134 (James E. Clayton ed., 1984) ("[W]hen passions run high and the nation's security
seems threatened from outside, a critic is even less likely than a prophet to find honor in his
own country.").
86 See Brenna Nava, Comment, Hurricane Katrina:Duties and Responsibilities, 37 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1153, 1155 (2006).
87 See Bell, supra note 27, at 140 (speculating that quartering during the Civil War occurred due to a general ignorance of the Third Amendment).
88 Cf infra Part II.E (analyzing whether remedies exist under the Third Amendment).
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doctrine of Qualified Immunity protected the New York governor's decision to quarter the National Guard in the corrections officers' dormitories. 89 Under this doctrine, government officials are not liable for the
damage resulting from their actions if their conduct "does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 90 This effectively insulated both the individual government actors and the state. Because no litigant had ever
brought a legitimate Third Amendment claim to court before, and because the Engblom court deemed the quartering as a proper "promptcounter measure" to quell vandalism in the prison, 9 1 it dismissed the corrections officers' claim. Hence, the litigants lost their case entirely because "it was the first time in the two-hundred-year history of the
Republic that someone had brought an arguably bona fide claim under
'92
the amendment.
Fourth, the circumstances surrounding post-disaster litigation create
an undesirable context in which to bring a Third Amendment claim.
Overcoming the hurdle of unbroken jurisprudential ground is problematic where litigants are seeking damages following disasters. In these
situations, lawyers, whose resources may have been compromised by the
disaster, must bring the claims of clients who have limited funds due to
losses from the disaster, before courts that are reeling from the disaster
themselves. 9 3 The litigants are most concerned with recouping losses
quickly through insurance or tort claims in order to begin rebuilding their
lives. 94 Lawyers, litigants, and courts do not have the time or resources
to lay the foundations necessary to flesh out the merits of a previously
unlitigated Third Amendment claim.
Fifth and finally, strong sentiments of patriotism in the wake of a
disaster may deter litigants from suing the government that "saved"
them, and sentiments of gratitude towards rescuers may deter litigants
95
from suing the men and women that aided them during the disaster.
Consequently, the situation in which the Third Amendment can offer the
most protection is a situation in which circumstances deter litigants from
seeking remuneration from the transgressions of soldiers.
89 Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1983).
90 Id. at 46 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
91 Id. at 49.
92 ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 111.

93 Nava, supra note 86, at 1157-58, 1162-63.
94 See Jeff Duncan & Coleman Warner, Waiting is Tough on Road Home, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 15, 2006, at 1.
95 Cf LESSONs LEARNED, supra note 7, at 133 (discussing how Federal agents in the Gulf
Coast opened up their houses to coworkers).
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WHY INVOKE THE THIRD AMENDMENT?

The drafters intended the Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties in the face of a powerful government. As the Supreme Court has
noted, civil liberties "imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." 96 The negative rights enumerated in the
Constitution, "function as an integral part of a larger system of morallegal norms whose purpose is to organize things so that the free life is
fully established and preserved. '9 7 They "limit governmental power so it
will most likely be used within its range of effectiveness and consistency
with freedom to foster the realization and perpetuation of the life of freedom." 98 As the most specific negative right, and the only amendment
"directly concerned with the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the military
in both war and peace," 99 the Third Amendment protects individual liberty when the government's authority manifests itself in its most unadulterated form-domestic military occupation.
William Douglas, who believed the Third Amendment lacked modem utility, 100 noted that when the country is the "throes of another national seizure of paranoia," the government takes more license with
invading the home and privacy. 10 1 This is particularly dangerous in the
case of domestic disasters and the military for two reasons: (1) people are
1 °2
more willing to sacrifice personal liberties for a feeling of security,
and (2) during disasters, when the rule of law fails, there are no institutional safeguards, other than the military itself, against civil liberties violations. Powerfully enforced negative rights deter the military from
depriving citizens of constitutional rights because of a fear that citizens
will successfully litigate these deprivations in court against the individuals responsible, and also because the military, made up of U.S. citizens,
or those seeking citizenship, will respect these rights on a normative
level.
The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that circumstances exist today where the Third Amendment may be relevant,
albeit in contexts not expressly contemplated by the framers or the legis96 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
97 Gary C. Bryner & A.D. Sorensen, The Future of Rights, in The BILL OF RIGHTS: A
BICENTENNIAL ASSESSMENT 235, 246 (Gary C. Bryner & A.D. Sorensen eds., 1993).
98 Id.
99 Fields, supra note 62, at 195.
100 See Douglas, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
101 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 329-30 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
102 See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 174

(2006) (noting that in times of crisis people have three reactions: they (1) overreact, (2) acquiesce to infringement of previously bedrock principles like a right to privacy, and (3) selectively sacrifice liberties of minorities to obtain security for the majority).
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latures that enacted similar colonial and British laws. The chances of a
disaster, manmade or natural, which incapacitates a civilian government,
may increase in coming years. 10 3 As a result, civilians may be less opposed to the government's use of military force to maintain order than
they were in the 20th century when the government acted to secure their
protection. 10 4 In this political context, the Third Amendment will have
two functions: (1) to protect individual rights; and (2) to curb expanding
executive and military power.
During states of emergency, elected executives at the state and federal level have increased authority to commandeer private property and
punish disobedience. 10 5 The executive exercises this power with the use
of National Guard or federal troops to restore order. 10 6 There are two
dangers to enhanced executive power and use of the military as a police
force. First, there is the danger that a temporary increase in executive
power for the sake of security can lead to a permanent diminution in
individual rights. 10 7 This is not necessarily an overt erosion. Executives
have the power to suspend laws during emergencies, 10 8 and while that
suspension is intended to be temporary, the effects can endure. Using his
emergency power to suspend city zoning ordinances, C. Ray Nagin,
Mayor of New Orleans, authorized dumping of debris on vacant land that
was not zoned to be a landfill. 10 9 Although Mayor Nagin shut down the

103 See Robert J. Rhee, CatastrophicRisk and Governance After HurricaneKatrina: A
Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/ll Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 582 (2006) ("We
live in an era of mega-catastrophes."); LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 5 ("Terrorists still
plot their evil deeds, and nature's unyielding power will continue. We know with certainty that
there will be tragedies in our future.").
104 See Charles J. Dunlap, Putting Troops on the Beat, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2006, at
A17.
105 See e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 8572, 8621 (West 2006) (an example of state law
conferring on the governor the power to commandeer private property during emergencies);
Hatfield v. Graham, 81 S.E. 533, 536 (W. Va. 1914) (holding the governor had power to order
troops to surround a socialist newspaper during civil disorder); see also LESSONS LEARNED,
supra note 7, at 11-19 (providing a "primer" in federal disaster management including the
President's power to declare state's of emergency).
106 See 10 U.S.C. 333(a)(i)(A) (2006) (conferring upon the President the discretion to use
the National Guard to maintain order when state authorities are incapacitated due to an
emergency).
107 See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianismand Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME, supra note 84, at 161, 161 ("Times of heightened risk to the
physical safety of their citizens inevitably cause democracies to recalibrate their institutions
and processes, and to reinterpret existing legal norms, with greater emphasis on security, and
less on individual liberty, than in 'normal' times.").
108 See, e.g., N.Y EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney 2006).
109 See Michelle Krupa, Nagin Will Order Landfill to Close, TIMEs-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 13, 2006, at 1.)
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landfill by not renewing the ordinance suspension, the existing debris on
the site remained.""0
Also, executives are prone to making poor decisions regarding military and law enforcement deployment during disasters' I'-disregarding
laws with which they are unfamiliar. Executives or military personnel
might quarter soldiers in private homes without the owners' consent due
to simple ignorance of the law.
Constitutional drafters anticipate some emergencies, but they failed
to anticipate all the ones that future decisionmakers will be forced to deal
with. Facing a Constitution seeming not to authorize or, worse, to prohibit actions that policymakers deem necessary for responding to the perceived emergency, decisionmakers, including courts, will feel pressure to
'interpret' the Constitution so as to allow the actions."1 2 This is even
more likely considering the failure of the Department of Homeland Security's National Response Framework to address military comman13
deering of private citizens' property.'
Second, the use of the military to maintain civil order can endanger
civil liberties. A recent newspaper columnist pointed out, "few models
exist around the world in which the recurring use of militaries in law
enforcement furthers democratic values."' 1 4 Soldiers are trained to fight,
not to be peace officers, and their actions reflect this training.'' 5 They
take a heavy-handed approach to maintaining order, and at times, that
approach can border on an abuse of power. This is especially true where
the soldiers in question are civilians who serve part-time with the National Guard. 116 After Hurricane Katrina, several National Guardspersons and civilian peacekeepers in New Orleans committed larceny,
burglary, and unlawful entry of businesses.' 17 There were reports of unpunished looting of stores by the National Guard, who stole jewelry, nar110 Id.
'''
See David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The
Waco Disasterand the Militarizationof American Law Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619,
644 (1997).
112 Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION
IN WARTIME, supra note 84, at 39, 43.
113 See DEP'T oF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 18-20 (2008),
available at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/, (detailing the role of private-sector entities
in disaster relief but not clarifying the extent to which private-sector entities or individuals are
required to relinquish property to government entities).
114 Dunlap, supra note 104.
115 Kopel & Blackman, supra note 11l, at 659.
116 See, e.g., Chris Rose, Shootin' From the Hip, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov.

26, 2006, Living, at 1.
117 National Guardsmen Court-Martialedand Their Punishments, ADVOCATE, Aug. 24,
2006, at A4; see also HORNE, supra note 7, at 123 (noting that New Orleans Police officers
commandeered over two hundred vehicles and that "stolen Cadillac Escalades would become
emblems of a big-city police department's breakdown in command").
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"Everybody stole stuff," reported one

Guardsperson, "but the only ones getting kicked out [were] the people
who saw the leadership [stealing]." ' 19 The National Guard had little federal supervision and often acted without consulting other military personnel. 120 One federal army soldier reported to Congress, "[T]he National
Guard seems to move in and out of sectors doing what they want then
just leaving without telling anyone ....,

The National Guard moved into the area affected by Hurricane Katrina rapidly, commandeering facilities without warning.' 2 2 Often, they
quartered in areas to quell looting and violence.1 23 Occasionally, civil-

ians returned to the storm-ravaged area to find small outfits of the National Guard living in unauthorized places. For instance, the
superintendent of the New Orleans' public golf courses returned to a
course three weeks after the storm to find "[N]ational [G]uard troops
sleeping in the clubhouse and wearing golf club apparel."' 2 4 On another
occasion, doctors returned to their hospital to find "that the infirmary's
data center had been turned into a command post for the Louisiana National Guard."' 125 In addition, private security forces, acting with government approval or under government contract, invaded New Orleans
homes. Employees of Blackwater USA, a private security firm, ransacked an apartment in the French Quarter, throwing "mattresses,
clothes, shoes, and other household items from the balcony to the street"
while federal troops watched.' 26 These abuses went unnoticed and unpunished because of the lack of clear command and communication
structures between forces operating in New Orleans and the surrounding
area. 127 Leadership structures and chains of command were constantly
118 Shields, supra note 17.
119 Id.

120 H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 219 (2006).
121 See Id.
122 Tim Doherty, Family Endures Katrina, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Dec. 25,

2006, Local, at lB.
123 See Zeke MacCormack, Area Counties Sizing Up Response to S.A. Disaster, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Sept. 20, 2005 (explaining that National Guardspersons were "sleeping on the ground in neighborhoods to try to control looting"); CNN American Morning, Sept.
4, 2005 (explaining that National Guardspersons were sleeping at a shopping mall to prevent

looting).
124 Alan Blondin, Devastation Still Being Felt: Katrina'sEffect on Gulf Coast Courses an
Eye-Openerfor GrandStand Layouts, SUN NEWS (Myrtle Beach, S.C.) Nov. 16, 2006, at 2.
125 See Zack Martin, DisasterRecovery, HEALTH DATA MGMT., Jan. 2007, at 30.
126 See JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL

MERCENARY ARMY 322 (2007).
127 See H.R. REP. No. 109-377 (2006), at 219; LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 43 ("A
fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated command structure for both active
duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communications and coordination issues during
the initial response."); Greg Gecowets, Coordination, Command, Control, and Communications, JoINT CTR.FOR OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS Q. BULL., June 2006, at 17 ("The rapid destruc-
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changing, and command centers had trouble keeping track of their troop
movements. 128 Intra-military communication was so poor that troops

were forced to rely on news media for information and damages assessments.' 29 This was partly because the National Guard was short on supplies and equipment, which would have facilitated transportation and
communication between units, while $1.2 billion worth of equipment
was left overseas in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. 130 In this chaotic and unregulated environment, where supplies are low and soldiers
are able to roam abandoned areas unsupervised, the likelihood of abuses
to private property by the military, and potential Third Amendment violations, is high.' 3' Therefore to avoid there violations, the Third Amendment must be considered in disaster planning and preparation. To best
do this, law and policymakers must understand how to recognize a potential Third Amendment violation and understand what remedies are
available.
III.

ANALYSIS: HOW TO INTERPRET THE
THIRD AMENDMENT

In the wake of a domestic disaster, the state' 32 or federal govern133
ment deploys the National Guard or the U.S. military to restore order.
In a disaster situation, the National Guard must make do with limited
infrastructure and resources within the affected area. To best restore order and serve victims of the disaster, states allow the Guard to utilize
tion of infrastructure, the loss of first response capability, and the lack of situational awareness
on the scope of the disaster across all levels of government, posed severe challenges to incident management.").
128 See Gecowets, supra note 127, at 21.
129 H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 22.
130 Mackenzie M. Eaglen, Go Guard... With What?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at
A19.
131 See Corbin v. Marsh, 2 Ky. (1 Duv.) 193 (1865) ("As the Constitution was made to
secure liberty and property against arbitrary and ambitious power, its guarantees are most
needful when there is most danger of the assumption of any such power; and where, therefore,
the safety of the people needs their only protection most.").
132 At least one scholar points out that the Third Amendment may not apply to states. See
Rex Martin, Civil Rights and the U.S. Constitution, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A BICENTENNIAL
ASSESSMENT,supra note 97, at 27, 48. The Second Circuit in Engblom v. Carey, however, had
no trouble finding that the Amendment applied to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment. 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982).
133 See Army National Guard Home Page, http://www.arng.army.milUAboutUs.aspx (last
visited Nov. 18, 2007). Typically, the relevant state governor is responsible for deploying and
overseeing the Guard in domestic disasters. Army National Guard Organizational Structure
Page, http://www.arng.army.mil/org-command.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). See also 10
U.S.C. 333(a)(1) (2006) ("The President may employ the armed forces, including the National
Guard in Federal service, to (A) restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States"
when, as a result of a disaster, the President determines that state authorities "are incapable of
maintaining public order.").
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private property in rescuing civilians and maintaining order.134 Some of
these uses may violate the Third Amendment. To understand the modem
applicability of the Third Amendment, it is important to examine each
clause in light of the framers' intent.

A.

SOLDIER

The Constitution provides little guidance for interpreting who qualifies as a soldier under the Amendment. 1 35 First, the term could be limited to include only Army troops at the exclusion of other military
branches. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution distinguishes between
land and naval forces, 136 whereas the Third Amendment makes no separate prohibition against quartering sailors. As a source for comparison,
New York's 1691 anti-quartering act protected citizens from "be[ing]
compelled to receive any Souldiers or Marriners . . . and there suffer
them to sojourn again their Wills. 1 37 Congress could have shortsightedly omitted the term sailor, feeling that soldiers presented more of
a threat than sailors, who usually occupy ships that contain a sufficient
number of berths. This is easy to explain if the Amendment is understood to be a direct response to the Quartering Act of 1774, which permitted the quartering of army soldiers. 138 However, since the
"amendment[ was] designed to prevent the arbitrary exercise of
power,"' 1 39 which can come at the hands of any branch of the military, it
is reasonable to conclude that any branch of the federal military could
violate the Third Amendment.
Given that the Third Amendment covers quartering of the federal
military, the next issue is whether the same exclusion applies to state
militias. Read in context with its neighboring Amendments, the Third
Amendment may not be intended to apply to state armies. The Second
Amendment explicitly references the necessity of a militia,140 and Article
I, Section 8 distinguishes a pre-existing state militia l4 from a congres134 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8572 (West 2006) (allowing the governor the right to
commandeer private property, which he can delegate to the National Guard).
135 See LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION 1020 (Thurston Greene ed., 1991) (demonstrating that the term "soldier" appears nowhere else in the Constitution).
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
137 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 217.
138 See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 107 (noting that the Third Amendment

was "written to address real and immediate grievances suffered by its authors").
139 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 54, at 180.
140 U.S. CONST. amend. II (noting that "[a] well regulated militia... [is] necessary to the
security of a free State").
141 The state militias are the predecessors to the modem National Guard. See George W.
Reilly, Veterans Journal: National GuardMarks 370 Years, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 18, 2006, at

C2.
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sionally-raised army.142 This reading is plausible given that the Supreme
Court has never explicitly incorporated the Third Amendment into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby applied
it to the states. 143 But the realities of military use and deployment strain
this interpretation. First, the modem National Guard is a far cry from the
state militias the founding fathers knew. It is a semi-professional corps
of well-trained troops capable of substituting the federal army in military
engagements.? 44 Second, National Guard troops are just as capable of
seeking forced quarter in private homes as federal troops. In fact, a
Third Amendment violation is even more likely to occur at the hands of
the National Guard. Guard troops, not federal ones, typically respond
145
first to national disasters.
If the term soldier encompasses the National Guard, the next question is how much farther the term extends. When considering the Third
Amendment's wording, the first Congress chose not to adopt New
York's more broadly worded anti-quartering provision of 1787, which
prohibited forced quartering of a soldier by any "[o]fficer, military or
civil, nor any other Person whatsoever."' 4 6 Under this act, nonmilitary
persons such as civilian law enforcement, and even those unaffiliated
with any government, could be liable for illegal quartering. By rejecting
this version, Congress may have intended to limit the scope of Third
Amendment liability to military personnel and their elected commanders-leaving forced quartering at the hands of others to be an issue
of trespass.
Drafters of the Third Amendment omitted sheriffs and constables,
the precursors to modem day police,147 from the literal scope of the
Amendment's protection. However, the drafters may not have necessarily anticipated the existence of the armed and uniformed peace-keeping
142 U.S. CONST.
143

See

art. I, § 8.
& THOMAS G.

LEE EPSTEIN

WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING

83-86 (6th ed. 2007). But see Engblom v. Carey,
677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982) (incorporating the Third Amendment into the Fourteenth
AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES AND JUSTICE

Amendment).
144 See Reilly, supra note 141; see also John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2002-2904)) (giving the President the power to commandeer National Guard troops in the
event of a domestic emergency).
145 See H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 201 (2006); Id. at 202 (noting that the National Guard
made up seventy percent of the military force used after Hurricane Katrina); see also Engblom,

677 F.2d at 961.
146 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 217. New York adopted a broadsweeping anti-quartering provision because it was occupied by the British for most of the war
and suffered more forced quartering than other colonies. See PRIMUS, supra note 44, at
106-07.
147 See Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, CRIME AND JUST. 547, 549 (1992).
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corps that make up the law enforcement agencies of today. 148 Also,
while historically the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the use of the
military as a police force, has rigidly maintained the line between military personnel and civilian law enforcement, 149 the introduction of military consultants and SWAT-type corps to civilian police forces and
federal investigative agencies has blurred the lines.' 50 The National
Guard itself comprises civilians that serve at the request of the government, 5 1 many of whom may have careers in law enforcement. 152 Because the Third Amendment attempts to diffuse the potential for
governmental oppression in the home, then by logical extension, Third
Amendment prohibitions could apply to any armed government official
wielding authority in a disaster area. The term soldier could be interpreted to include those officials for purposes of Third Amendment protection. This interpretation could even include private security forces
working under government contract. 53 This is especially true given that
disaster areas are inundated with armed officials from every level of gov1 54
ernment as well as private security details.
In the week following Hurricane Katrina, thousands of officials
from federal agencies, state national guards, police departments from
other cities, and private security forces patrolled the streets of New Orleans. Even medical technicians in New Orleans were armed with M-16
rifles.1 55 Every military and law enforcement agency was theoretically
coordinated by a Joint Field Office ("JFO") run by the Department of
Homeland Security.' 56 The JFO coordinated patrols, meals and accommodations, 57 although supervisors from each enforcement agency were
meant to "maintain accountability for their assigned personnel with regard to exact location(s)."' 158 Military and civilian law enforcement personnel patrolled together-held equally accountable for transgressions
148 See id. at 553 (noting that most uniformed urban police forces were created between
1850 and 1880).
149 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (forbidding the use of military for domestic law
enforcement).
150 See id. at 649-50; c.f. 18 U.S.C. § 2332e (2006) (permitting the Attorney General to
request military assistance in situations involving weapons of mass destruction).
151 See Rose, supra note 116.
152 See id.
153 See SCAHILL, supra note 126, at 324 (noting that Blackwater USA security forces

claimed to be patrolling New Orleans under contracts with the Department of Homeland Security and the state of Louisiana).
154 See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY 9-18 (2003) (detailing the global scope of the privatization of the military and the
need for "radical reassessments" of how to handle them).
155 See ANDERSON COOPER, DISPATCHES FROM THE EDGE 168 (2006).
156

See U.S.

DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., JOINT FIELD OFFICE FIELD OPERATIONS GUIDE

1 (2006).
157 Id. at 2-3.
158 Id. at 2-4.
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committed on joint patrols.' 59 Given that (1) all these armed personnel
were theoretically under federal supervision, (2) they had joint liability
for the damage they caused on joint patrols, and (3) there is a lack of a
historical distinction between soldiers and other armed government personnel, the Third Amendment could cover anyone who acted in an official capacity in the Gulf Coast region after Hurricane Katrina.
B.

QUARTER

The next relevant issue is to define what conduct constitutes quartering. The two issues of uncertainty inherent in the anti-quartering
clause are (1) the scope of the term "quarter," and (2) the distinction
between quartering and trespass. According to Samuel Johnson's 1755
Dictionary of the English Language, "to quarter" meant "to station or
lodge soldiers."' 60 "To lodge" was defined as "[t]o place in a temporary
habitation," "[t]o afford a temporary dwelling," or "[t]o harbour or
cover." 1 6 1 "To station" was defined as "[t]o place in a certain post, rank,
or place."'162 Given this definition of quartering, which likely still applied at the time the framers drafted the Bill of Rights, a Third Amendment violation could occur where a soldier was "placed," presumably by
order, in a house, or sought harbor or cover in the house. Therefore, a
soldier would not have to sleep, eat, or necessarily use personal property
in the house to fall within the Third Amendment. This interpretation is
consistent with the assumption that the framers were concerned that undisciplined soldiers quartered in civilian homes could harm civilians or
damage or steal property. Given this concern, the scope of the term
quarter could include uses of property such as taking food or clothes
from a home.
It is thus possible that the National Guard or other military personnel committed some act of quartering in New Orleans in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. The National Guard was responsible for patrolling
flooded areas and checking abandoned houses for victims after the hurricane.' 63 The vast majority of the population had evacuated, leaving
thousands of empty homes and desolated neighborhoods possibly available for military use. And although not widespread, there were isolated
159 See Former Kenner Official Sues Police Chiefs in Arrest; Floyd Was Booked in Misappropriation,TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 10, 2006, Metro, at 1 (noting that the
former official sued the National Guard and the police together).
160 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (lst ed. 1755) (defining
"to quarter"). In modem usage, to quarter means "to lodge or dwell," MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1018 (11 th ed. 2003), which may lead to a narrow interpretation of
the Third Amendment, strictly applying to occasions where soldiers lived in a structure.
161 Id (defining "to lodge").
162 Id. (defining "to station").
163 Gordon Russell et al., News from New Orleans Parishes, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 12,
2005, Special, at 4.
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incidents of National Guardspersons and police looting in the Gulf Coast
region after Hurricane Katrina. 164 In one case, as noted above, National
Guard troops in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina were living in a
165
golf course clubhouse wearing clothes stolen from the pro shop.
While residing in the pro shop constitutes quartering, it is unclear
whether wearing the clothes from the shop also constitutes quartering.
On another occasion, hospital workers returned to find that the National
Guard had transformed their "infirmary's data center into a command
post.

' 166

While the soldiers may not have slept in the data center, they

were making use of it at the expense to the hospital. The National Guard
commandeered facilities wherever they could in order to restore order to
the region; 167 some of this commandeering could fit within a definition
of quarter.
The second issue is whether illegal entry into property by soldiers
constitutes quarter, or merely trespass. Historically, when soldiers have
occupied private property, private citizens have sued for trespass and not
under the Third Amendment. 168 Part of the distinction may lie in who
ordered the soldiers to occupy the property. Soldiers acting on their own
accord, without direction from a superior officer, may not be compelling
quarter on private property, but instead may be committing trespass as
private citizens.1 69 On the other hand, while the Third Amendment may
have been an immediate response to the British Quartering Acts, earlier
legislatures passed anti-quartering provisions in English towns and
American colonies to help prevent individual soldiers from abusing civilians and personal property. History is rife with stories of troops stealing
food, destroying homes, and assaulting civilians. In the fourteenth-century poem Piers Plowman, a farmer laments that soldiers killed his wife,
raped his daughter, and destroyed his barn.170 Early anti-quartering laws
recognized that forced quartering occurs at gunpoint, and not by formal
edict.
164 See HORNE, supra note 7, at 85, 123.
165 Blondin, supra note 124.
166 See Martin, supra note 125.
167 See, e.g., Paul Purpura, Hospital Lawsuits Probably Moot; Meadowcrest Can't Be
Expropriated, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 23, 2005, Metro, at I (noting that the
National Guard had commandeered the hospital for use as sleeping quarters in the aftermath of

Huricane Katrina).
168 Ashby v. New York, 103 Misc. 206, 207 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1918); Smith v. Illinois, 2 Ill.
Ct. Cl. 149 (Ct. Cl. 1912); White v. M'Neily, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 11 (1784).
169 Ashby, 103 Misc. at 208 (describing how a National Guard unit occupied a farm,
destroyed the farmers property, and pastured horses in the farmer's field, and holding that the
unit's actions were not an exercise of state police power or eminent domain powers because no
superior officer had ordered the trespass, making the acts "mere wrongs and trespasses of
individuals, who mistakenly assumed to act in [the state's] name").
170 See LANGLAND, supra note 30, at 34.
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If the framers' intended the Third Amendment to curb unruly military personnel, then invoking Third Amendment rights may have been
necessary in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Anderson Cooper, a
CNN reporter, noted how disorderly the military and law enforcement
personnel became when they were not on duty. Describing the scene in
the first strip club to reopen in New Orleans, he wrote, "The place is
filled with the storm's flotsam and jetsam: cops and soldiers, National
Guard, Border Patrol, Customs-you name it, they're all here, their
badges and guns badly concealed. They're... horny as hell and twice as
bored."1 7 1 Cooper was in the club to meet a New Orleans police officer-the officer arrived late, explaining that he had been in a bar, and a
National Guardsperson took his seat while he was in the bathroom. "So I
grabbed him and took him outside," the officer told Cooper. 1 72 This
story is consistent with others, reporting law enforcement abuses of
power and violence. 17 3 The fact that some members of the law enforcement and peace-keeping forces acted this way, and that command control
centers had trouble keeping track of their forces, 174 illustrates that the
concerns of early anti-quartering law drafters regarding soldiers is still
relevant, and therefore the Third Amendment is still necessary to restrain
them. Given this interpretation, the Third Amendment may extend to all
quartering of soldiers, regardless of whether it is promulgated from a
higher authority.
C.

HOUSE

Historically, both private and public dwelling spaces were included
in anti-quartering provisions.' 7 5 In passing the Third Amendment, Congress rejected a proposal to create a provision allowing billeting of
soldiers in public houses or inns without consent.' 76 This may indicate
that Congress intended the Amendment to cover quartering in public fa177
cilities such as hotels or hospitals.
A related issue is whether non-owner occupants of "houses" have
standing to claim Third Amendment protections. According to the language of the Amendment, the owner of the "house" must consent to
quartering in peacetime. 178 However, this does not answer the question
171 COOPER, supra

172 Id. at

note 155, at 189.

190.

173 See HORNE, supra note 7, at 123; see also CBS News: New Orleans Cops Indicted
(CBS television broadcast Mar. 30, 2006) (reporting that two New Orleans Police Department
officers were indicted by a federal grand jury for beating a man in October 2005), available at
www.cbsnews.com (search for video by title); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
174 See Gecowets, supra note 127, at 21.
175 See supra Part I.
176 THE COMPLETE BHL OF RmIrrs, supra note 31, at 218-19.
177 See Wurfel, supra note 21, at 733.
178 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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of whether non-owners have the authority to refuse quartering.1 79 In
Engblom v. Carey, the Southern District of New York used a test from
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: "whether the

person claiming protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy usu80
ally arising from a property or possessory interest in the premises."'
The court held that the prison guards claiming Third Amendment protec-

tion did not have a claim because their tenancy in the dormitories commandeered

employment."'

by the National
81

Guard were "incident

to their

In an analogous situation, in October 2005, the Presi-

dent of St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, commandeered a hospital in order
to house the National Guard. Hospital workers protested outside, concerned that closing the hospital would jeopardize their jobs.182 The hospital workers did not live in the hospital, so their only claim of ownership
to the facility would have been incident to their employment, and therefore, under the Engblom standard they probably would not have had

standing to bring a Third Amendment claim. However, patients of a hospital might have a Third Amendment claim in that situation. In Algiers,
a district of New Orleans, the National Guard occupied the rooms of
1 83
evacuated residents of the Our Lady of Wisdom Healthcare Center.
Similarly, law enforcement officers, firepersons, and Emergency Medical
Technicians slept in an emptied nursing home nearby. 184 If the residents
of these facilities left possessions behind before the storm, 185 and in-

tended to return to the hospital after the storm, they may have had the
expectation of privacy necessary for Third Amendment standing under
86

Engblom.1

Ultimately, however, consent to quarter derives from the owner of
the house, which raises the question of whether an owner's consent to

quarter could trump that of a resident. If the corporate owner of the
179 Presumably, if a non-owner occupier consented to quartering but the owner refused,
the owner's refusal would trump the non-owner occupier's consent. In this way, the owner's
right to refuse is vested in his property rights, while the non-owner's fight to refuse, if such a
right exists, is vested in a right to privacy as well as property rights.
180 Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir.
1982) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).
181 Id. at 67; see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 109 (noting that the
dormitories furnishings and accessories were supplied by state).
182 Hurricane Katrina-The Aftermath, Weblog for Day 49, http://times-picayune.com
(Oct. 14, 2005).
183 Lisa Hollis, Health Care Center's Director Wins Honor, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 4, 2007, at 6.
184 See HORNE, supra note 7, at 125.
185 See Engblom, 522 F. Supp. at 63 ("[Tlhe striking resident correction officers were
ordered to clear out their rooms specifically to provide quarters for the Guard.").
186 See also Neil Hayes, New Orleans Payton's Super Home, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 15,
2006, at 122 (the National Guard also requisitioned the New Orleans Saints training facility
where members of the team may have kept personal effects).
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healthcare center or nursing home, as the owner of the "house," gave
187
consent to quarter, this might override the objections of the patients.
In Engblom, the correctional officers' refusal to quarter was essentially
trumped by the consent of the state, which owned the prison.188 However, this result runs counter to the jurisprudence of the Third Amendment's closest constitutional relative, the Fourth Amendment's Search
and Seizure Clause. The Supreme Court has held that landlords do not
have permission to give consent to the searching of their tenant's rented
space.' 89 Similarly, the Second Circuit, in which Engblom was decided,
held that hotel guests have standing under the Fourth Amendment to
challenge law enforcement entry into their room.' 90 Both Third and
Fourth Amendment consent situations revolve around the expectation of,
and right to, privacy. In fact, the Third Amendment litigant's claim to
privacy may be even stronger than a Fourth Amendment litigant because
quartering is an indefinite duration occupation of the litigant's living
space, while a police search, although intrusive, is brief. Therefore, the
consent of an owner to quarter troops in a house would probably not
trump a non-owner-occupier's refusal.
D.

TIMES OF PEACE AND WAR

The most interesting clauses for analyzing modem Third Amendment application are the peace and wartime distinctions. In time of
peace, soldiers must obtain consent to quarter from homeowners, while
in times of war, soldiers may be quartered in homes in a manner prescribed by law. 19 1 In addition to the literal language, legislative history
indicates that the peace-wartime distinction was important to the framers.
In the Third Amendment debates, Congress rejected a motion by Repre92
sentative Thomas Sumter to strike out the peace-wartime distinction.
The distinction essentially permits forced quartering during times of war,
presumably acknowledging that necessity may compel the government to
limit civil liberties and property rights for the sake of preserving local
187 It is unclear whether the owner or occupier of the house would have to be a natural
person. See Stephen G. Wood, Applicability of Hunman Rights Standards to Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 549 (Supp. 2002) (noting that "[n]o
cases have been decided concerning whether corporations are protected from the prohibition
on the quartering of soldiers"). If corporations have standing, then a claimant might not need
to reside in the house to have standing.
188 See Engblom, 522 F. Supp. at 67.
189 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
190 United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1980).
191 See Cobb, supra note 8.
192 CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra note 54, at 179.
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peace or the nation itself. 193 Given that the government has the power to
override Third Amendment protections in wartime, it is necessary to first
determine what qualifies as wartime.
Traditionally, wartime exists when Congress declares war on another nation. 194 One military historian noted, "[whether] war in the legal
sense exists will depend upon whether the parent state recognizes the
insurgents as belligerents."' 195 Wartime may also exist when part of the
nation is in a state of martial law. 196 Most broadly, an area is under
martial law "when military authorities carry on government or exercise
various degrees of control over civilians or civilian authorities in domestic territory."' 97 Although states are constitutionally forbidden from declaring war unless actually invaded, 198 today some states have delineated
between peace and wartime emergencies, wartime emergencies occurring
when the nation is attacked, or in probable or imminent danger of attack. 199 Comparatively, states of emergency occur when there are "conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and
property," which civilian services are unable to handle adequately. 2°°
While the distinction between war and peacetime appears clear at
the center, it is less clear at the margins. Martial law is a malleable term
that "has been employed in various ways by different people and at different times,"2 01 and executives have wielded the term to quell rebel-

lions, 20 2 break strikes, 20 3 and even compel oil production. 2°4 For much
of the 20th century, the Cold War brought the constant threat of war to
civilian population. 20 5 After September 11, 2001, the United States engaged in a global "War on Terror" with no clear enemy and no clear
193 See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1931) ("[I]n the theater of actual war,
there are occasions in which private property may be... impressed into public service, and the
officer may show the necessity in defending an action for trespass.").
194 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.11.
195 CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 117 (2d ed. 1943).
196 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 45 (1849) (declaring that an insurrection in Rhode
Island was a "state of war").
197 Ochikubo v. Bonesteel, 60 F. Supp. 916, 928 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
198 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.3.
199 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8558(a) (West 2006).
200 See § 8558(b).
201 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315 (1946). See generally Duncan, 327
U.S. at 320-22 (giving a brief history of martial law in England and America).
202 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 7 (1848).
203 See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
1492-PRESENT, at 206-89 (1995) (detailing numerous accounts of gubernatorial use of martial
law powers and the National Guard to break up strikes).
204 See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 387-90 (1932).
205 See generally People v. City of Chicago, 108 N.E.2d 16, 21 (111. 1952) ("War is no
more a creature of the restricted battlefield, a deadly enterprise conducted according to rules
and limitations. Today its destruction may spread throughout the nations, by-passing the soldier and spreading havoc among the all civilian population.").
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end. 20 6 Today, the government responds to war and peacetime disasters
in similar ways. In both scenarios, it employs military force to keep
order. For instance, the military deployment in the aftermath of Hurri207
cane Katrina was the largest since the Civil War.
The drafters distinguished peacetime and wartime in the Third
Amendment in order to give the government the ability to diffuse lawlessness and defeat enemies quickly during wartime, 20 8 while ensuring
protection of civilian homes in peacetime. While the country is engaged
in a War on Terror, the country may be in a continual state of wartime
for purposes of the Amendment. Any diminution in the nation's ability
to govern itself, whether it is through a man-made or natural disaster,
could constitute a threat to national security that cannot be tolerated during wartime. The issue remains whether wartime and peacetime are
broad, national states of affairs that pre-exist and outlast a discreet disaster and military response, or whether they can be localized in time and
space to the specific disaster that requires military quartering. The arguments on both sides are strong. On the one hand, when civil disorder
caused by domestic disaster must be quelled by military force, the government should be able to respond rapidly and flexibly without being
constrained by individual hold-outs. On the other hand, citizens most
need the Third Amendment to safeguard their right to privacy and prop20 9
erty during disaster situations in which the civilian rule of law fails.
The next step in determining the viability of a Third Amendment
claim is to determine what the parameters are for legal wartime and
peacetime quartering. If a domestic disaster occurs during wartime,
' 210
quartering would be permissible "in a manner prescribed by law."
Presumably, "by law" refers to an act of Congress. 21 1 Legislative history
supports this interpretation. Congress rejected a motion by Elbridge
Gerry to insert "by a civil magistrate" into the Amendment. 2 12 As
206 See

Gregory R. Copley, World War III by Any Other Name, DEF. & FOREIGN AFF.
3, 3-4 (Sept. 2001); see also LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 5 ("Ter-

STRATEGIC POL'Y

rorists still plot their evil deeds ....").
207 H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 201 (2006).
208 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 219 (noting one Congressman's
concern that unless Congress had the power to order wartime quartering, "cases might arise
where the public safety would be endangered by putting it in the power of one person to keep a
division of troops standing in the inclemency of the weather for many hours").
209 See Corbin v. Marsh, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 193, 194 (1865) ("[T]he Constitution was made

even more for the turbulence of war than the calm of peace.").
210 U.S. CONST. amend. Il.
211 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power ... [t]o make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all ... powers vested by
this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.").
212 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RiGHTs, supra note 31, at 208.
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Thomas Hartley, another member of Congress, said, the prescription of
'213
quartering "ought to be entrusted to the legislature.
Given that quartering in wartime can only occur through legislation,
the next issue is whether Congress can confer the power to quarter to the
executive or to military personnel for the sake of expediency or necessity. The Supreme Court has noted that the military can take civilian
property when there is an immediate danger or "necessity urgent for the
public service. 2 1 4 By extension, if a soldier felt he was in danger and
demanded quarter in a civilian's home, there would not likely be a Third
21 5
Amendment violation.
If a domestic disaster, when the country is not in a declared war, is
more like peacetime, quartering would only be permissible at the consent
of the owner. 2 16 Although this might hinder rescue efforts, it preserves
civilian's rights in the face of authoritarian military occupation. This
reading conforms to the Gerry's rationale for passing the Third Amend'21 7
ment: "to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power.

E.

REMEDIES

Critical to the analysis of the Third Amendment is whether citizens
have any remedies for their Third Amendment claims. Since no case has
reached the remedies stage on a Third Amendment issue, and since no
legislature has created statutory guidance, litigants must look to history
and analogous amendments.
Despite the lack of a remedies provision in the Third Amendment,
courts likely have jurisdiction to prescribe some remedy and will in fact
find that a Third Amendment violation is actionable prospectively for
injunctive relief or retroactively for damages against both the state or
federal government and individual military personnel committing the violations. Whether the suit is brought against the state or federal government would likely depend on which sovereign was exercising authority
over the military. Under 5 U.S.C. § 702, the federal government has
waived its sovereign immunity to suits seeking to enjoin an unconstitutional act by an arm of the government. 2 18 A suit to enjoin the state
would likely lie in the Amendment itself imposed on the states through
213 Id. at 219.
214 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (quoting Mitchell v. Harmony, 13

U.S. 115, 134 (1851)).
215 See State v. Pinsince, 192 A.2d 605, 607 (N.H. 1963) (compelling civilians to seek
shelter in an emergency was not a violation of their constitutional rights). But cf. Smith v.
State, 2 Ill. Ct. Cl. 149, 149 (Ct. Cl. 1912) (holding soldiers liable for trespass and destruction
of property for conducting a "sham battle.").
216 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
217 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 220.
218 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2008).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 19 Because the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified after the Eleventh Amendment, the Court has held it overrides
states' sovereignty. 220 Also, individual officers may be enjoined in federal court. 22 1 Thus, theoretically, a litigant could seek to enjoin the military and its officers from quartering troops in the litigant's home.
Seeking an injunction prior to a domestic disaster is unlikely, however,
given that litigants will not have advance notice of the use of military in
the area.
It is more likely that a litigant would seek damages from the government or an individual officer after the Third Amendment violation. As
the Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison, "The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. ' 222 More recently, the Court noted that "[h]istorically, damages have been regarded
2 23
as the ordinary remedy for invasion of personal interests in liberty.
The state government would be subject to suit under the Amendment
itself. 224 The federal government would be subject to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 25 Under the statute the federal government
waives sovereign immunity for negligent acts committed by its agents,
including the intentional tort of trespass. Individual soldiers would most
likely be liable for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.22 6 There Court found that a plaintiff
had a cause of action for damages where the plaintiff alleged that government enforcement officers entered his home in violation his Fourth
2 27
Amendment right to protection from unreasonable search and seizure.
Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding state governments may be
sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended to override state sovereignty). Note that state legislatures or judiciaries impose bars
on suits against them for damages incurred during disasters. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8655
(West 2006) ("The state or its political subdivisions shall not be liable for any claim based
upon the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state or local agency or employee of the state or its political
subdivisions in carrying out the provisions of this chapter."); Dudley v. Orange County, 137
So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1962) (holding that the state was immune from liability for flood damage
incurred by private citizens as a result of damming during a natural disaster). The Third
Amendment, imposed through the Fourteenth Amendment, would likely override these state
laws. Note also that this Note does not address to what extent litigants could prevail on claims
under anti-quartering provisions in state constitutions. See Bell, supra note 27, at 144-45
(explaining that most states today have anti-quartering provisions in their constitutions).
221 See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
222 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
223 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395 (1971).
224 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
225 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2008).
226 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
227 See Id. at 389.
219 See
220
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Since Bivens, the Court has found causes of action for damages under the
First,2 28 Fifth,2 29 and Eighth 230 Amendments. These Amendments, like
the Third Amendment, protect individuals from potential deprivation of
rights or property at the hands of government officials. Also, given that
violations of the Third and Fourth Amendments involve invasion of
places in which individual have an expectation of privacy, courts would
likely find that individual military soldiers and possibly government contractors 23' would be liable under Bivens for Third Amendment
violations.
Under one method of remedy, citizens could receive compensation
for quartering soldiers similar to the "just compensation" received for
Fifth Amendment violations. 232 As the Supreme Court noted in Luther v.
Borden, "if the sanctity of domestic life has been violated, the castle of
the citizen broken into, or property or person injured, without good
cause, in either case a jury of the country should give damages, and
courts are bound to instruct them to do so, unless a justification is made
out fully on correct principles. '2 33 Some states expressly include a compensation provision within their emergency powers statutes.2 34 The fact
that quartering may be done out of necessity caused by the disaster
should be irrelevant. As one court pointed out, the Takings Clause "has
2' 35
the same validity in time of war as in time of peace.
However, the most challenging obstacle for Third Amendment litigants seeking damages is overcoming the shield of Qualified Immunity
that protected individuals in Engblom v. Carey.2 36 In Engblom, the district court held the National Guard was "shielded from liability" on two
grounds: (1) the Guardspersons' "conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
228 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1980) (accepting the Bivens actions for First
Amendment violations are permissible).
229 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
230 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
231 Although the Court has held that a Bivens suit was not permitted against privately
operated prison, Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001), the Court has not
yet reached the issue of whether private citizens acting under government contract would be
liable under Bivens. But cf Holy v. Sott, 434 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2006) (barring Bivens action
against employees of a privately operated prison working under federal government contract).
232 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

233 48 U.S. 1, 87 (1949).
234 See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8570(i) (West 2006) (declaring that the Governor has the
power to "[p]lan for the use of any private facilities, services, and property, and, when necessary and when in fact used, provide for payment for that use").
235 Atwater v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 196, 208 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1946) (quoting Causby v.
United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 342, 349 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1945)) (holding that a taking existed where
the military sought to condemn the property to use as an aerial gunnery during World War II).
236 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1983).
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would have known, ' 2 3 7 and (2) their "actions were taken during an emergency as 'prompt-counter measures"' necessary to quell alleged vandal238
ism by the strikers.
Given the lack of Third Amendment case law and scholarship coming out of situations in which Third Amendment violations likely occuffed, 2 3 9 individual Guardspersons would not necessarily know that
they were violating a constitutional right. Courts like in Engblom may
be sympathetic to their lack of knowledge based on this widespread ignorance of the existence of, or lack of appreciation for, the right.
Historically, courts have ruled favorably for soldiers who use their
discretion to preserve order, even when the soldiers restrict civil liberties
or confiscate private property. 240 During the Civil War, states enacted
indemnity statutes to protect soldiers from suit for damages caused by
following orders. 24' Similarly, the Model Penal Code makes "executing
an order" of a superior officer an affirmative defense. 2 42 Soldiers may
also defend their actions on the grounds of necessity, similar to the Engblom defendants. A century and a half ago, the Supreme Court set a
fairly low threshold for what constitutes necessity, requiring that the soldier demonstrate that he had "reasonable grounds to believe" that the
"nature and character of the emergency" at issue compelled him to take
civilian property. 243 Thus, during an actual disaster, a soldier could
likely seek shelter in a home for necessity without fear of incurring Third
Amendment liability. Under these circumstances, the best claim a liti244
gant may have is trespass.
Recently, however, there has been judicial resistance to the Doctrine
of Qualified Immunity that might override a defense of necessity or following orders. The Supreme Court recently held that officers may not
avail themselves of a qualified immunity defense if "the facts alleged
show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. '245 Also, tra237 Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1983) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
238 Id. at 49.
239 See supra Part II.B.
240 See Drehman v. Stifel, 41 Mo. 184, 206 (1867), affd, 75 U.S. 595 (1869) ("A sagacious military commander is apt to see necessities that are not apparent to everybody."); see
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the military's exclusion of
persons of Japanese ancestry from sections of the west coast during World War II).
241 See FAIRMAN, supra note 195, at 283-96.
242 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (1985).
243 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 135 (1851).
244 Cf.Amar, supra note 83, at 1508 (noting that "state remedies such as trespass may
continue to help plug the remedial gap" in Fourth Amendment violations by federal agents).
245 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
201 (2001)). But see id. at 202 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Law enforcement officers should
never be subject to damages liability for failing to anticipate novel developments in constitutional law.").
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ditionally qualified immunity has only applied to money damages and
not injunctive relief. 246 Furthermore, if law and policymakers begin to

incorporate the Third Amendment in their decision making in the wake
of large domestic disasters, executives and soldiers may not have the
shield of qualified immunity to protect them.
In addition, the military may claim immunity, arguing courts lack
jurisdiction to hear claims involving incidents that occurred pursuant to
executing martial law. 247 The Supreme Court has held, however, that

civil courts would have jurisdiction in post-martial law litigation and that
martial law "was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by
'24 8
military tribunals.
In a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina, where infrastructure is so
damaged that the governmental personnel must rely heavily on private
facilities for shelter and logistics,

249

use of private property, even private

necessary.2 50

On the other hand, in a situation where
homes, may be
lines of communication are tenuous and chains of command uncertain,
there is a greater need to hold the government accountable for the actions
25
of military personnel. '
CONCLUSION
This Note attempts to examine the potential application of the Third
Amendment to twenty-first century domestic disasters. Increased awareness of the Amendment and the rights it attempts to protect may serve
citizens in the aftermath of large-scale disasters. If the Third Amendment has a well understood meaning and application, it will become part
246 See Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1997).
247 See Robert S. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS: MARTIAL LAW AND ITS LEGAL BASIS
INTHE UNITED STATES 110-11 (AMS Press, Inc. 1965) (1939) (arguing that martial law exists
when civil courts are unable to properly render justice).
248 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 543
U.S. 507, 535 (holding that protection of citizens' "core rights" outweighed a need for limiting
civilian court jurisdiction in the due process claims of enemy-combatant detentions).
249 See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-377, at 22 (2006) (noting that the National Guard relied
on the national media for information and damage assessments); Hayes, supra note 186 (reporting that the National Guard commandeered an NFL training facility); Whitford, supra note
15 (reporting that the National Guard commandeered all of the trucks in a pest control
business).
250 L.K. Underhill, Jurisdictionof Military Tribunals in the United States over Civilians,
12 CAL. L. REV. 159, 178 (1924) (arguing that in order to preserve order, the military "may
have to go farther than peace officers may do, and refuse, for the time being, to obey the order
of a court to vacate ... property").
251 See George E. Edwards, InternationalHuman Rights Law Violations Before, During,
and After Hurricane Katrina: An International Law Framework for Analysis, 31 T. MARSHALL. L. REV. 353, 418 (2006) ("[A]II States, and the international community as a whole,
must condemn, seek to halt, and facilitate remedies for international human rights law violations that occur in the United States, including Katrina-related international human rights law
violations.").
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of the fabric of laws and rules that the government applies; if it has no
perceived application, the rights it was intended to protect will be lost. If
emergency workers are cognizant of the Third Amendment's application
to their work, they may be more respectful of people's homes and property. On the other hand, it may be unreasonable, and potentially dangerous, to check relief operations with blanket restrictions. Enforcing the
Third Amendment stifles the human compassion essential to mitigating

disasters by making rescue workers more concerned about liability than
252
about saving lives.
In disasters, in war, it isn't governments that help people, at least not early on. It's individuals: policemen,
doctors, strangers, people who stand up when others sit
down. There were so many heroes in [Hurricane Katrina], men and women who grabbed a bandage, an axe,
253
a gun, and did what needed to be done.
Writing on the need for an anti-quartering amendment to the Constitution, the newspaper Federal Farmernoted, "[T]he English, always in
possession of their freedom, are frequently unmindful of the value of it:
we, at this period, do not seem to be so well off, having, in some instances abused ours; many of us are quite disposed to barter it away for
what we call energy, coercion, and some other terms we use as vaguely
as that of liberty .... -254 Today some scholars accuse Americans of
making the same mistake: relinquishing liberties for the sake of security. 255 During disasters Americans are willing to sacrifice civil liberties
to the state's claim of "emergency powers. '256 To best preserve individual rights while still ensuring rapid disaster recovery, Americans must be
aware of two things. First,
[e]mergency does not create power. Emergency does
not increase granted power or remove or diminish the
restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.
The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal Government
252 See Rhee, supra note 103, at 602-03 ("Government action then in times of crisis can
be a poisoned tonic, the perceived remedy that can in fact be a harmful agent.").
253 COOPER, supra note 155, at 182.
254 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
255

See

supra note 31, at 221.
Riors

NAT HENTOFF, THE WAR ON THE BILL OF

AND THE GATHERING RESIS-

17 (2003) ("[A]s this war on terrorism continues, young Americans will have become
accustomed to-indeed conditioned to-the diminishment of the Bill of Rights."); Mark E.
TANCE

Brandon, War and the American Constitutional Order, in TrIE

CONSTITTION IN WARTIME,

supra note 84, at 20 ("[C]oncern for national security has contributed to the diminution of
rights . .. for everyone.").
256 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 84, at 56 ("[T]he costs of a temporary dictatorship
...and suppression of civil liberties are less than the costs of national destruction.").
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and its limitations of the power of the States were deter-

mined in light of emergency and they are not altered by
257
emergency.
Second, constitutional protections such as the Third Amendment do
not function in a vacuum but require a well-maintained and respected
constitutional system. 258 If the government uses its self-proclaimed
"emergency powers" to erode that system, eventually it will no longer
protect the rights Americans take most for granted.
On the whole, the National Guard's rescue and recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina were herculean. The Department of Defense estimates that the National Guard rescued 17,000 stranded civilians and
evacuated 70,000 from the region. 259 They transformed private facilities
into temporary hospitals and shelters for victims of the storm.2 60 Their
presence was a welcome sight to many. One woman wrote a year later,
"When I came back to assess my property, I was glad to see these 'M16toting' [G]uardsmen all over. It gave me a some [sic] sense of security."' 2 6 1 Given this attitude, if there was any quartering of National
Guard troops in homes, it may have been consensual 26 2-or civilians
who discovered the quartering after they returned to their homes may
have accepted it as necessary for rescue operations. But the National
Guard are soldiers, and soldiers are capable of abusing their power. Civilians acquiescing to martial protection after disasters must be aware of
this danger and cognizant of their rights-especially their most forgotten
ones.

257 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).
258 See Baker, supra note 20, at 55 ("[A] bill of rights depends for its effectiveness on
other political and constitutional conditions .... [T]he protection of liberty in the United
States derives in large part from other components of the constitutional system.").
259 DEP'T OF DEF., U.S. ARMY RELEASE, HURRICANE KATRINA: NATIONAL GUARD'S FINEST HOUR (Aug. 29, 2006).
260 See Mick Walsh, Orthopedic Tech Has Seen Two War Zones, COLUMBUS LEDGERENQUIRER (Columbus, Ga.), Sept. 6, 2006, at 1.
261 Cindy Bulligan, Letter to Editor, Security Measures Needed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Aug. 24, 2006, Metro, at 6.
262 See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 7, at 133; 30 Mobile Homes Given to Guardsmen,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 5, 2006, at 22 (reporting that Dow Chemicals donated
mobile homes to house Guardsmen while storm-wreaked barracks were being renovated).

